Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA by Shudtz, Matthew et al.
Workers at Risk:  
Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA
By CPR Member Scholars Thomas McGarity, 
Rena Steinzor, and Sidney Shapiro, 
and CPR Policy Analyst Matthew Shudtz
 
 Center for Progressive Reform
Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA
About the Center for Progressive Reform
Founded in 2002, the Center for Progressive Reform is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit research and educational 
organization comprising a network of  scholars across the nation dedicated to protecting health, 
safety, and the environment through analysis and commentary.  CPR believes sensible safeguards in 
these areas serve important shared values, including doing the best we can to prevent harm to people 
and the environment, distributing environmental harms and benefits fairly, and protecting the earth 
for future generations.  CPR rejects the view that the economic efficiency of  private markets should 
be the only value used to guide government action.  Rather, CPR supports thoughtful government 
action and reform to advance the well-being of  human life and the environment.  Additionally, CPR 
believes people play a crucial role in ensuring both private and public sector decisions that result in 
improved protection of  consumers, public health and safety, and the environment.  Accordingly, CPR 
supports ready public access to the courts, enhanced public participation and improved public access 
to information.  The Center for Progressive Reform is grateful to the Public Welfare Foundation for 
funding this report, as well as to the Deer Creek Foundation, the Bauman Foundation, and the Open 
Society Institute for their generous support of  its work in general.
This report is a collaborative effort of  the following Member Scholars and staff  of  the Center for 
Progressive Reform:  Thomas McGarity, University of  Texas—Austin School of  Law; Sidney 
Shapiro, Wake Forest University Law School; Rena Steinzor, University of  Maryland School of  
Law; and Matthew Shudtz, CPR Policy Analyst.
For more information about the authors, see page 31.
www.progressivereform.org
For media inquiries contact Matthew Freeman at mfreeman@progressivereform.org
 or Ben Somberg at bsomberg@progressivereform.org. 
For general information, email info@progressivereform.org
© 2010 Center for Progressive Reform
Cover Photo: Courtesy WikiCommons. 
CenTeR fOR  
PROGReSSive RefORM 
WHiTe PAPeR #1003
february 2010
Acknowledgments
The Center for 
Progressive Reform is 
grateful to the Public 
Welfare foundation 
 for its generous 
support of 
 this project. 
Printed in the U.S.A. 
Center for Progressive Reform Page 1
Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA
executive Summary
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was born with a heavy load to 
bear – the obligation of  ensuring that every worker in America has a safe and healthful 
workplace for his or her entire working life.  In its early years, OSHA acted with great vigor, 
establishing important standards for occupational health and safety that have prevented 
hundreds of  thousands of  injuries and illnesses.  But the agency has not aged gracefully.  
Today its enforcement staff  is stretched thin and the rulemaking staff  struggle to produce 
health and safety standards that can withstand industry legal challenges.  In short, OSHA is a 
picture of  regulatory dysfunction.
Regulatory dysfunction in the federal government is manifest in administrative agencies 
that lack the resources, statutory authority, leadership, and affirmative help from the White 
House to accomplish the goals Congress has set out for them.  OSHA’s current leadership 
– Assistant Secretary David Michaels and Deputy Assistant Secretary Jordan Barab – are 
committed to revitalizing the embattled agency by turning it into a professional regulator and 
competent enforcement agency.  But Michaels and Barab have inherited a resource-starved 
agency operating under a statute that has been enfeebled by 30 years of  troubling appellate 
court decisions and White House initiatives that substantially increase the time and effort 
needed to implement a proactive regulatory agenda.
This white paper explores the causes of  OSHA’s regulatory dysfunctions and describes their 
negative impacts on OSHA and America’s workers.  With the decreasing power of  unions to 
organize and press employers to implement strong health and safety programs, employees in 
every occupation rely on OSHA to protect them from occupational hazards.  Yet, in the last 
decade, OSHA has dropped more standards from its regulatory agenda than it has finalized, 
largely due to insufficient budget authority.  And the agency’s enforcement program has 
assessed such paltry fines for even fatality-related violations of  the law that many employers 
see no incentive in addressing hazards, much less developing precautionary health and safety 
programs.  
After describing OSHA’s problems in detail, this paper outlines a number of  reforms that 
could enhance the agency’s performance.  Although certain aspects of  the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act could use improvement, the recommendations in this paper focus on 
regulatory reform – that is, administrative actions that OSHA could implement in the short 
term.  A subsequent white paper will address legislative reform.
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TABLe 1. Recommendations for OSHA Regulatory Reform
Enforcement Use the General Duty Clause to protect workers who are exposed to chemicals that lack OSHA-derived Permis-•	
sible Exposure Levels.
End the practice of regularly discounting penalties before they’re even proposed.•	
Publish all negotiated settlement proposals for public comment.•	
Conduct a rigorous analysis of what resources would be required to make the OSHA inspection program a •	
credible threat for employers chronically out of compliance, restoring the efficacy of deterrence-based enforce-
ment throughout the agency.
Based on that analysis, request substantial increases in funding from the White House.•	
Redesign the scope and priorities of National Emphasis Programs, seeking advice of inspection staff.•	
Improve training to promote criminal referrals.•	
Work with state and local prosecutors to prompt criminal indictments in certain cases.•	
Rethink the proper balance between traditional enforcement (inspections) and “compliance assistance.” •	
Rulemaking Seek additional resources to increase rulemaking staff.•	
Ask the Solicitor of Labor for a new analysis of risk assessment burdens imposed by the •	 Benzene decision.
Use generic standards to combine multiple hazards or agenda items into a single rulemaking.•	
Avoid the use of negotiated rulemaking.•	
Conduct peer reviews, when necessary, concurrently with public comment periods and hearings.•	
Improve transparency with respect to the White House Office of Management and Budget’s interaction with •	
the agency. 
Recordkeeping Update IMIS (OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System).•	
Work with the Bureau of Labor Statistics to improve the quality of injury and illness statistics.•	
Develop a strategy for eliminating employer prizes and disciplinary actions that lead to incorrect injury and •	
illness reporting. 
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introduction
In 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the state of  
occupational safety and health programs in the meat and poultry industry that painted a 
picture eerily reminiscent of  the images described in Upton Sinclair’s 1906 masterpiece, 
The Jungle.  GAO’s account of  conditions endured by newly immigrated workers in the 
slaughterhouse industry provides a shocking reminder that occupational hazards are not 
confined to heavy industry.
The type of  work performed and the plant environment expose workers to 
many hazards.  The work is physically demanding, repetitive, and often re-
quires working in extreme temperatures—such as in refrigeration units that 
range from below zero to 40 degrees Fahrenheit—and plants often have high 
turnover rates.  Workers often stand for long periods of  time on production 
lines that move very quickly, wielding knives or other cutting instruments 
used to trim or remove portions of  the carcasses.  Conditions at the plant 
can also be loud, wet, dark, and slippery.  Workers responsible for cleaning 
the plant must use strong chemicals and hot pressurized water to clean in-
side and around dangerous machinery, and may experience impaired visibility 
because of  steam.  … While the most common injuries are cuts, strains, cu-
mulative trauma caused by repetitive cutting motions, and injuries sustained 
from falls, more serious injuries, such as fractures and amputation, also occur.  
For example, according to OSHA data, a worker died when he attempted to 
replace his knife in the scabbard hanging from his belt, missed the opening, 
and pushed the knife into his leg, severing his femoral artery.  In addition, 
some workers become ill because of  exposure to chemicals, blood, and fecal 
matter, which can be exacerbated by poor ventilation and extreme tempera-
tures.1
What differentiates the workers in today’s meatpacking industry from the workers in the 
early 1900s is the existence of  a law – the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) 
– and an agency – the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) – that 
were designed to ensure modern workers would have a safe and healthful workplace.  The 
OSH Act paved the way for federal regulatory standards that are “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of  employment.”2  And it 
worked.  OSHA’s health and safety standards have been credited with a significant decrease 
in work-related illness and injury where those standards have been created and enforced.  
The “lockout/tagout” standard, which required the installation of  devices to ensure that 
heavy machinery was not turned on while repairs were being made, for instance, was credited 
with 30-percent annual reductions in lockout-related fatalities in the auto industry in its first 
eight years and a 55-percent reduction in lockout/tagout-related fatalities at ten basic steel-
producing companies between 1990 and 1997.3
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However, in more recent years, illness and injury rates have stopped declining, and today’s 
injury and illness rates are virtually the same as 15 years ago, suggesting that OSHA is 
not utilizing new and evolving knowledge about managing occupational hazards to foster 
improvements in U.S. workplaces.
Observing OSHA in its struggle to implement and enforce the OSH Act is a study of  
regulatory dysfunction.  OSHA and its state partners employ fewer than 2,100 inspectors 
to keep tabs on more than 8 million U.S. workplaces.4  OSHA must meet so many analytical 
requirements that it takes more than a decade to implement a single new standard.  By one 
count, OSHA is subject to 18 different statutory, court-created, and administrative limits on 
its rulemaking process.5
Organizational structures that separate enforcement staff, rulemaking staff, researchers, 
and agency lawyers prevent OSHA from operating as efficiently as possible.  This paper 
describes, in detail, how these sources of  regulatory dysfunction have serious implications 
for workers’ health and safety and lists a series of  legal and regulatory reforms that could 
reinvigorate the troubled agency.
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Resource Shortfalls
Regulatory dysfunction at any agency, and in particular at OSHA, begins with resource 
constraints.  Often, the most difficult and most important work for a regulatory agency 
is the most resource-intensive.  Enforcement that has a meaningful deterrent effect is the 
prime example.  Inspectors must be trained and deployed across the entire country.  OSHA 
must develop fair and effective mechanisms for targeting the most dangerous worksites for 
inspection by trained personnel.  If  conducted properly, a compliance assessment at a very 
large worksite might take 2,000 employee-hours.  The accompanying legal proceedings can 
drag on for months or years.  In Fiscal Year 2010, OSHA will spend about $227 million 
on federal enforcement programs, but will only have the capacity to inspect 40,000 of  the 
nation’s more than 8 million workplaces.
Proactive rulemaking to manage emerging hazards, such as lung disease linked to diacetyl, 
and other flavoring chemicals used in the popcorn industry, can also be a huge resource 
drain.  Every type of  OSHA employee – economists, engineers, occupational health 
specialists, lawyers – is involved in the development of  new health and safety standards.  
Coordinating their work is difficult and costly.  
Yet, OSHA operates on a shoestring budget.  OSHA’s budget climbed steadily in the 1970s, 
funding the agency’s growing capacity to develop new rules and enforce the OSH Act, 
which in turn triggered a backlash from the business community.  Under the Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush administrations, OSHA’s budget was first cut and then held roughly even 
with inflation.  The Clinton administration gave OSHA a boost, and the agency’s budget 
reached an historic high in 2001.  But that was the same year that the agency published its 
ill-fated ergonomics standard, and, like OSHA’s aggressive enforcement in the late 1970s, 
the ergonomics standard elicited a backlash in the business community and a subsequent 
whittling-away of  the agency’s budget under George W. Bush.
fiGURe 1:  fY 2010 Proposed Budget
Technical Support ($25.9M)
40%
State programs ($106M)
Federal enforcement 
($227M)
19%
13%
10%
6%
3%
2%
5% 2%
Compliance assistance — federal 
($73.4M)
Compliance assistance — 
state ($54.6M)
Training grants ($10M)
Safety and health statistics 
($34.9M)
Safety and health standards 
($19.6M)
Executive direction ($11.5M)
Total Budget: 
$563 Million
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One important feature of  OSHA’s budget is the part of  OSHA’s annual budget authority 
that is distributed to various states.  Under the OSH Act, individual states can assume 
responsibility for protecting workers’ health and safety by creating state-level laws, 
institutions, and resources that are at least as effective in providing safe and healthful 
workplaces as OSHA and the OSH Act.6  The Secretary of  Labor has approved 27 such 
“state plans,” although in five states the state’s jurisdiction only covers public employees.  
When a state plan is approved, OSHA generally relinquishes responsibility for inspecting 
worksites in the state but provides the state with significant funding to carry out its 
occupational safety and health program.  States may receive up to 50 percent of  their 
occupational safety and health budgets in the form of  federal grants.  For the last ten years 
(prior years’ breakdowns were not readily available), about one-fifth of  OSHA’s proposed 
budget has been distributed to state-plan states.
Of  the remaining 80 percent of  the agency’s budget, half  is spent on federal enforcement 
activities (worksite inspections and accident and whistleblower investigations), and half  is 
spent on all of  OSHA’s other activities.  This last 40 percent of  OSHA’s budget is where 
the priorities are the most skewed.  Almost a quarter of  OSHA’s total budget is directed 
to compliance assistance programs that have a weak track record.  A mere 2 percent of  
the budget goes to worker training programs, and just 3 percent of  the budget goes to 
improving health and safety standards.  The small percentage of  OSHA’s budget spent on 
rulemaking only begins to tell the story.  Claiming that insufficient resources stand in the 
way, OSHA has withdrawn more rules from its regulatory agenda than it has finalized in the 
last decade.7
OSHA’s $513 million budget for Fiscal Year 2009 is less than 0.02 percent of  the year’s $3.1 
trillion total federal outlays, such an infinitesimal portion that funding the agency at adequate 
levels would not affect the country’s capacity to reduce the deficit in any meaningful manner.  
Adequate funding for the agency would mean improving the ratio of  inspectors to workers.  
In the late 1970s, the ratio of  federal inspectors to federally protected workers was about 
OSHA’s $513 
million budget 
for fY 2009 is 
less than 0.02 
percent of the 
year’s $3.1 
trillion total 
federal outlays.
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1 to 30,000.  Today, an OSHA inspector covers more than 60,000 workers.  Increasing 
the number of  federal inspectors, along with a corresponding increase in funding to state 
programs would yield obvious improvements in workers’ safety and health.  In recent years, 
OSHA has been able to increase enforcement staff  at a cost of  about $125,000 per full time 
staff  person.  Doubling the enforcement staff  would obviously involve significant other 
costs (infrastructure, etc.), so at a minimum, OSHA would need another $125 million per 
year.  We recommend that OSHA initiate an objective and critical analysis of  what resources 
are necessary to conduct inspections with a frequency that employers once again are 
concerned about becoming the target of  deterrence-based enforcement. 
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An Outmoded Rulemaking Process
The foundation of  any successful regulatory program is effective regulations.  They provide 
a starting point for enforcement programs, predictability for the regulated community, and 
– most importantly – protection from hazardous conditions.  In the nearly 40 years since 
its enactment, the OSH Act has been exposed as a virtually useless tool for establishing 
occupational health and safety standards.  As interpreted by the courts, the OSH Act requires 
such extensive analysis of  hazardous conditions and potential regulatory interventions 
before OSHA can regulate that the agency has only been able to set standards for the most 
obvious and egregious problems (e.g., machines that could accidentally begin operating while 
employees are servicing them).  Occupational hazards that can cause less obvious injuries 
– for instance, lung cancer that does not manifest for decades or developmental problems 
in a pregnant worker’s child – are left unabated or are regulated only through limits set in 
the early 1970s by private and quasi-public standard-setting organizations relying on science 
from the 1940s and ’50s.  The OSH Act’s standard-setting provisions are the second major 
source of  OSHA’s dysfunction.
OSHA standards come in two forms – health standards and safety standards.  Health 
standards address hazards like lead, chromium, asbestos, or other toxic substances that cause 
illnesses when employees are exposed to them either for short or long durations.  Safety 
standards are designed to prevent injuries caused by harmful physical agents, like stairs or 
raised platforms without railings or industrial machinery without guards around moving 
parts.  The distinction is important because the courts have interpreted the rulemaking 
requirements for the two types of  standards differently.  The legal requirements for setting 
health standards are more stringent.  In practice, however, OSHA must navigate a political 
gauntlet that makes development of  any standard an arduous process.  Since updating the 
exposure limits for methylene chloride in 1997, OSHA has revised just one other health 
standard (hexavalent chromium) and created two new safety standards (vertical tandem lifts 
at marine terminals and fire protection in shipyards).  OSHA has made revisions to a number 
of  other standards, but it has not finalized any new health standards related to chemicals that 
were not already covered by OSHA standards.
OSHA’s inability to establish new health standards more efficiently can be traced, in large 
part, to a Supreme Court decision that gave the agency analytical burdens not intended 
by Congress.  In AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,8 commonly known as the Benzene 
decision, the Supreme Court held that OSHA must determine that workplace exposure 
creates a “significant risk” before it can regulate.  The OSH Act’s rulemaking requirements 
do not use the term “significant risk,” leading legal scholars to criticize the decision as an 
example of  judicial over-reaching.  
The practical problem with Benzene is that the high court failed to provide useful guidance 
as to what analysis OSHA should undertake to prove a significant risk.  The Supreme Court 
famously said that a one-in-a-thousand cancer risk would clearly be a “significant” risk, but a 
one-in-a-billion risk might be considered “insignificant.”  With little else to build on, OSHA 
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staff  must undertake extensive quantitative risk assessments for any hazard they believe 
needs to be controlled through regulation.  To get a sense of  the burden, a mere summary 
of  OSHA’s risk assessment on the 2006 hexavalent chromium standard took up 117 pages 
of  the Federal Register.9 The entire rulemaking process took more than a decade and was only 
completed under court order.  
Although the “significant risk” requirement does not apply to safety standards, OSHA 
is required to prove that safety standards are economically “feasible.”  A feasibility 
determination includes an analysis of  the costs of  compliance in relation to consumer prices 
and the financial health and profitability of  the industry.10 However, the Supreme Court 
has also held that OSHA need not determine that costs bear a “reasonable relationship” 
to benefits, the issue at stake in traditional cost-benefit analysis, because the feasibility 
analysis required by the OSH Act is intended to be a significantly less demanding test.11 
Nonetheless, feasibility analyses can result in regulations that are less protective then they 
might be otherwise.  For example, like other federal agencies, OSHA is overly dependent on 
the regulated industry for data regarding the costs of  compliance, but industry’s estimates 
often exceed actual compliance costs, sometimes by orders of  magnitude.12  Moreover, 
OSHA is overly focused on demonstrating the feasibility of  controlling hazards using 
existing technology, neglecting to analyze emerging or cutting-edge technologies, process 
changes, or other options that are more cost-effective but might lack data on the economic 
costs of  implementation.  The agency’s excessively cautious interpretation of  the statute is 
the primary reason why the OSH Act, while clearly intended by Congress to be technology-
forcing, has failed in that regard.  OSHA policymakers tend to be gun-shy about using 
regulation to force new technologies because they fear that the lack of  historical economic 
data will prevent the new standard from standing up to the courts’ “hard look” review.13
“Hard look” review, a general standard for judicial review of  regulatory decisionmaking 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), is uniquely stringent in the context of  the 
OSH Act.  Typically, courts review administrative actions by taking a “hard look” at the 
record of  evidence the agency has developed to ensure its completeness, and then examining 
the agency’s decision to ensure that it is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  But the 
OSH Act includes an instruction about judicial review not found in other statutes.  Section 
6(f) states that OSHA rules “shall be conclusive if  supported by substantial evidence in the 
record considered as a whole.”14  Congress’s requirement that OSHA’s rules be supported 
by “substantial evidence in the record” signals to the courts that the legislature wanted more 
searching review than is applied to regulations issued by other agencies.  As a result, OSHA 
staff  spend large amounts of  time and resources developing the data needed to support 
significant risk determinations and economic feasibility analyses.
As if  the burdens found in the OSH Act were not enough, Congress and the Executive 
Branch have devised additional hurdles for OSHA to overcome before it can regulate 
occupational hazards.  As noted, 18 different statutory, court-created, and administrative 
procedural limits slow the OSHA rulemaking process.  Executive Orders on regulatory 
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impact and flexibility analyses are some of  the most problematic, because they give White 
House officials significant sway over the shape of  new rules, to the detriment of  OSHA’s 
experts.  The White House Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) has even mandated 
external peer review of  certain scientific documents, which might do more to delay new 
rules than it does to improve their quality.  Congress, too, has established a number of  
impediments to development of  new occupational safety and health standards, through 
statutes that have failed to achieve their “good government” objectives.  Examples include 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Paperwork Reduction Act, Congressional Review Act, and 
Information Quality Act.
The Small Business Regulatory Fairness Act (SBREFA) is often the largest obstacle in the 
standards-development process.  Before OSHA can even publish a proposed rule in the 
Federal Register, it must convene and gather input from a Small Business Advocacy Review 
Panel.  These panels comprise several Small Entity Representatives, officials from the 
Small Business Administration’s Office of  Advocacy, and officials from OMB’s Office of  
Information and Regulatory Affairs.  While OSHA officials have expressed appreciation 
for SBREFA panels’ input, suggesting that they bring to light issues not originally realized 
by agency staff, it is not clear that these panels provide any information that could not have 
simply waited until the notice of  proposed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register.  
The panels create delays in the rulemaking process without producing any intrinsic benefits.
Over the years, there have been a number of  attempts to devise new ways to prioritize 
and conduct OSHA rulemaking, but each has come up short.  Unions and public interest 
organizations have attempted to use the OSH Act’s provision for emergency temporary 
standards to force the agency to act.  When employees are exposed to “grave danger,” 
the OSH Act empowers OSHA to issue emergency temporary standards as direct final 
rules, without having to go through the normal OSH Act or APA procedures.  Following 
publication of  the direct final rule, OSHA must go back and start a standard rulemaking for 
the hazard at issue.  Though OSHA has issued a few emergency temporary standards, it has 
more often denied requests to do so from outside groups.
In 1988, OSHA Administrator John Pendergrass tried to update more than 300 health 
standards in one fell swoop, only to have those updates thrown out by a federal court.  From 
1970 until 1972, Congress had given OSHA the power to adopt certain occupational health 
standards without undertaking the normal rulemaking procedures.  Through the expedited 
process, OSHA adopted more than 400 standards based on recommendations from 
quasi-public standard-setting organizations like the American Council of  Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).  OSHA failed to update those standards in 
the intervening years, so Pendergrass attempted a single rulemaking in which 212 of  the 
original PELs would be updated and 164 new substances would be regulated, largely based 
on recommendations from ACGIH and NIOSH.  This generic approach was thrown out by 
the 11th Circuit because OSHA had not adequately analyzed the risks and feasibility for each 
18 different 
statutory, 
court-
created, and 
administrative 
procedural 
limits slow 
the OSHA 
rulemaking 
process.
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hazard, which the court understood was required by the Supreme Court’s Benzene decision 
and the D.C. Circuit’s Lead I decision.15
OSHA has tried to use negotiated rulemaking (“Neg/Reg”) to speed up its production of  
standards, but this has proven to be no solution.  Through negotiated rulemaking, OSHA 
brings together the stakeholders who would normally stand at loggerheads and asks them 
to negotiate a rulemaking proposal that the agency will then use as the basis for regulation.  
OSHA proposes the general contours of  the proposed standard and the stakeholders are 
given broad leeway to craft its content in the expectation that they will agree on a standard, 
paving the way for OSHA to enact it and eliminating judicial challenges by stakeholders.  
The Neg/Reg process has been attempted several times, yet it has produced little progress.  
Either the groups cannot come to agreement (e.g., benzene negotiations in 1983-84) or, even 
when they do, unanimous consensus is not reached and the standard ends up at the center 
of  the same battles it would have been absent the Neg/Reg process (e.g., cranes and derricks 
negotiations proposal, under review with the Secretary of  Labor for over five years now).
OSHA’s rulemaking process is in need of  drastic reforms.  At the same time chemical 
manufacturers are creating about 700 new chemicals each year, OSHA is drafting new health 
standards at a rate of  about two per decade.  And out of  the tens of  thousands of  chemicals 
that are already on the market, OSHA has set standards for only about 400.  Those standards 
are almost 40 years old already, and based on science from the 1940s and 1950s.  Congress, 
to its credit, has occasionally set strict deadlines for promulgation of  new standards (e.g., 
lead, hexavalent chromium) and OSHA has been able to meet them.  But OSHA still 
operates under heavy burdens imposed by the courts and the White House, and Congress 
must consider changes to the OSH Act that will free the agency to set standards more easily.
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enforcement
When OSHA first began enforcing the consensus standards it adopted in the early 1970s, 
the agency’s inspectors made the strategic mistake of  strictly enforcing even the most 
trivial facets of  the standards.  Employers were appalled by what they perceived to be a 
heavy-handed and adversarial new federal agency and they took their case to Congress and 
the Reagan administration, which slashed OSHA’s funding in the early 1980s.  Since then, 
OSHA has struggled to design a broadly effective enforcement program that properly 
balances traditional enforcement proceedings with voluntary programs.  OSHA’s difficulty 
in designing an adequate enforcement regime is reflected in the national injury and illness 
statistics, which, as noted earlier, are virtually the same as fifteen years ago.  Resources, 
both money and staff, are a significant problem, of  course.  But another major impediment 
to a more effective enforcement regime is the agency’s failure to collect adequate data to 
determine which programs are working and which programs are not.
Traditional enforcement
OSHA employs about 1,100 inspectors and state-plan states employ another 1,300 
inspectors.  With more than 8.6 million workplaces in the United States., and some 
inspections demanding more than 2,000 hours to complete, federal and state officials cannot 
be expected to inspect even a small fraction of  U.S. worksites in any given year.  OSHA’s 
inspection of  the BP Texas City oil refinery, for instance, delivered a record $87 million fine 
proposal, but it took six months to complete.
Instead, OSHA has adopted a number of  different programs to prioritize its work so as to 
have the most significant impact on reducing occupational injury and illness rates.  OSHA 
inspectors’ primary focus is on “unprogrammed” inspections, i.e., investigations of  fatalities, 
catastrophes, reports of  imminent danger, worker complaints, and referrals from other 
inspectors or other government officials.  Unprogrammed inspections make up about a third 
of  OSHA’s annual inspections.  With their remaining time, inspectors work on programmed 
inspections.  OSHA’s three main programs for identifying worksites in need of  inspection are 
the Local and National Emphasis Programs (LEPs and NEPs), the Site-Specific Targeting 
program (SST), and the Enhanced Enforcement Program (EEP).
‘Unprogrammed’ Complaint inspections
Inspections conducted in response to complaints make up a majority of  OSHA’s 
unprogrammed inspections.  When OSHA receives a complaint about a workplace hazard, 
the complaint is categorized and prioritized based on the severity of  the alleged problem.  
Allegations of  serious violations (those that could result in death, permanent disability, 
chronic or irreversible illness, amputation, blindness, or third degree burns) elicit on-site 
inspections, as do written and signed complaints from current employees that provide 
reasonable grounds for believing that a specific OSHA standard is being violated.  Other-
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than-serious allegations are investigated by OSHA employees over the telephone or using 
faxed letters of  inquiry in order to conserve agency resources and maintain a less adversarial 
relationship between the agency and regulated employers.  Between 2000 and 2002, two-
thirds of  complaint inspections were conducted by phone or fax.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied several years of  inspection data 
and discovered problems typical of  the dysfunctions that run throughout the agency.16  For 
one, GAO found wide non-compliance with the requirement that regional administrators 
annually conduct audits of  their area offices’ operations.  With only five of  ten regional 
offices conducting the required audits, OSHA headquarters cannot properly assess whether 
complaint response programs are working well.  GAO also found that when inspectors go 
out to worksites to investigate serious complaints, they only discover violations in about 50 
percent of  their visits, raising an issue of  whether this type of  investigation is the best use of  
OSHA’s resources.  This result, however, may be tied to the fact that, under current policies, 
inspectors who go to worksites to investigate complaints are limited to only investigating 
violations alleged by the complainant.  Blatantly obvious violations observed in the course 
of  an inspection will be considered, but inspectors may only expand their work into a 
comprehensive inspection if  doing so would comport with the OSH Act, “Area Office 
priorities,” and “pre-determined criteria from their offices [used] to determine the necessity 
for expanding the scope of  an investigation.”17 This approach, which is undoubtedly driven 
by OSHA’s chronic lack of  resources, defeats efforts to build a credible, deterrence-based 
enforcement program because it robs OSHA of  the opportunity to make the most out of  its 
inspection process. 
Local and national emphasis Programs (LePs and nePs)
The starting point for OSHA’s programmed inspections is a complex scheme that ranks 
industries by nationwide injury and illness rates, groups them according to hazard type 
(safety hazard versus health hazard) and relative injury rates, and then generates randomized 
lists of  workplaces for inspection.  Since this system does not always ensure inspection 
priorities that reflect administration policy or emerging occupational safety and health 
concerns, OSHA uses special emphasis programs – NEPs and LEPs – to target specific 
industries and hazards.  LEPs are chosen by regional and area office staff  based on their 
experience with local employers, and the programs are subject to approval by the national 
office.  NEPs are designated at the national level.  While designation of  an NEP by the 
national office ensures that each regional and area office adopts a parallel local plan, regional 
and area office staff  retain significant flexibility in choosing worksites for inspection within 
the industries covered by the NEP.  OSHA has approved more than 140 LEPs, eleven NEPs, 
and one pilot NEP.
Local and regional enforcement staff, the OSHA personnel most intimately involved in 
day-to-day enforcement proceedings with employers, have voiced support for LEPs because 
they believe that professional experience is a better guide in choosing inspection targets 
nePs for fY 2010
Trenching Hazards•	
Petroleum Refinery •	
Process Safety 
Management
Shipbreaking•	
Amputations•	
Crystalline Silica•	
Lead•	
Combustible Dust•	
Chemical Facility PSM •	
(Pilot in Regions I, VI, X)
Diacetyl and other Food •	
Flavoring Chemicals
Primary Metals•	
Occupational Asthma•	
Recordkeeping•	
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than a neutrally oriented computer program.  NEPs garner less support from the rank-
and-file because of  the perception that they are defined by beltway politics instead of  field 
experience.  
Site-Specific Targeting (SST)
The SST program complements the normal programmed enforcement system and emphasis 
programs by identifying and targeting for inspection the most dangerous worksites in 
high-hazard industries.  However, this program excludes the construction industry, which 
has become notorious for excessive injuries, especially because it relies on migrant laborers 
who are not well-trained.  An analysis by The Texas Observer, for example, estimated that 
a construction worker in Texas dies every two and a half  days, including such avoidable 
incidents as collapsing trenches.  Like the standard programmed enforcement system, SST 
utilizes a nationwide database to randomly select worksites for inspection.  However, the 
SST program selects only worksites within industries that are considered “high-hazard,” a 
designation linked to high injury and illness rates and high levels of  employment.  Each year, 
OSHA sends out an information request to about two-thirds of  the 140,000 worksites in the 
United States with more than 40 employees, asking them for information about how many 
employees worked for them in the previous year, how many hours they worked, and for a 
summary of  the data from their injury and illness logs.  OSHA then computes injury and 
illness rates and creates lists of  worksites with relatively high rates.  OSHA’s regional offices 
then log into a system that randomly selects for inspection worksites in their geographical 
jurisdiction from the master lists.  In total across the country, OSHA conducts 2,000 to 4,000 
SST inspections each year.
Despite all of  the work OSHA puts into data gathering and analysis to support the SST 
program, GAO concluded – and some officials at OSHA’s regional and area offices agreed 
– that the program does not effectively identify hazardous worksites.18  GAO found “that 
for about half  the worksites identified through this process, inspectors were unable to do an 
inspection or, if  they did, cited no serious violations.”  OSHA staff  have expressed concern 
that these success rates are not a large enough increase over the NEP/LEP system to justify 
the considerable resources that go into collecting and analyzing the data needed to run the 
SST system.  One problem is that the SST system relies on a single year’s injury and illness 
data to target inspection sites, a flaw in the model that fails to recognize trends and could put 
too much emphasis on outlier years.  In addition, the data is not always reliable, which means 
SST inspections have been triggered by employers’ poor recordkeeping rather than their 
inability to ensure workers’ health and safety.  Finally, the data that drive the SST program 
might be useful for identifying worksites with serious safety hazards, but they are relatively 
useless for identifying noncompliance with health standards because the impacts of  these 
failures will take many years to manifest themselves.
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enhanced enforcement Program (eeP)
Following a New York Times/Frontline investigation into a spate of  deaths and injuries at 
McWane Pipe, OSHA established the EEP to supplement the NEP/LEP system and the 
SST program.  EEP was designed to target recalcitrant employers in high-risk industries, 
in particular, employers that have multiple worksites with similar potential hazards.  EEP 
is a program that is triggered after an OSHA inspection.  When an incident triggers an 
EEP, OSHA uses a number of  enhanced enforcement techniques, including:  notifying the 
company’s corporate headquarters (to give them notice and opportunity to correct similar 
hazards at other sites), imposing more stringent requirements for settlement negotiations, 
carrying out follow-up inspections, raising the priority of  inspections of  the company’s other 
worksites under SST, and obtaining enforcement orders if  the company fails to abate the 
hazard and holding the company in contempt if  it still does not abate.19
Five years after EEP began, OSHA’s inspector general (IG) found serious flaws with OSHA’s 
implementation of  it in three regions.20  Not only did the OSHA staff  fail to designate 
appropriate cases for the EEP, thereby hampering the program’s effectiveness from the start, 
but the staff  also failed in every aspect of  the follow-up procedures.  Furthermore, the IG 
found that revisions to the EEP program requirements in 2008 substantially limited the 
number of  cases that could be designated for EEP follow-up procedures.
Other problems with the EEP include an unduly high bar for initiating action.  OSHA 
recognizes six triggers for EEP designation, but three of  them require that the inspection 
was prompted by a fatality.  Even when there has been a fatality, there may not be an 
EEP designation.  OSHA will only designate a firm for EEP if, in addition to the fatality, 
a number of  other criteria are met.  Those criteria focus on the type of  violation that 
led to the death and the employer’s compliance history.  But compliance history is only a 
useful measure of  a firm’s concern for its workers’ health and safety if  the firm has been 
the subject of  regular inspections over the years.  Given OSHA’s resource constraints and 
the vast number of  covered worksites, it is unlikely any individual firm has a significant 
inspection history.  If  the EEP is worth doing, it is worth doing right.  And OSHA still has a 
long way to go in putting into place a program that severely punishes egregious violators and 
effectively discourages future scofflaws.
fine Assessment
The failings of  the EEP only affect OSHA’s ability to deal with the most recalcitrant 
violators of  the OSH Act.  The larger problem with OSHA’s post-inspection procedures is a 
weak system for administering penalties after finding violations at any workplace.  Beginning 
with penalties that have low statutory limits, inspectors and then supervisors in OSHA’s 
area offices, regional offices, and national headquarters regularly exercise their discretionary 
power to reduce penalties to levels so low that they have little deterrent effect on employers.
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A study by the majority staff  of  the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions (HELP) shows that OSHA’s internal policies regarding penalty determination 
effectively transform the OSH Act’s allowance for penalty reductions into a mandate.21  
Inspectors’ template worksheets for calculating fines require discount calculations from the 
start.  Then, area directors, regional administrators, and Department of  Labor attorneys can 
reduce penalties further – and often do, after informal conferences with cited employers.  
Finally, OSHA officials can reduce penalties if  the cited employer challenges the citation 
and enters into settlement negotiations with the agency.  Looking at all fatality investigations 
in 2007, the Senate HELP committee staff  found that the median penalty initially assessed 
by OSHA investigators ($5,900 after calculating discounts) was reduced by 38 percent over 
the course of  the internal review and conference with the cited employer.  Even in cases of  
more derelict conduct – willful violations of  the OSH Act that led to an employee’s death – 
the report found that, in 2007, there was a 58-percent decrease from the initial to the final 
penalty.  The median final penalty in fatality cases in 2007 was just $3,675.
OSHA claims that penalty reductions are necessary to spur settlements.  OSHA feels 
compelled to settle cases because it lacks the resources to litigate.  But no deterrence-
based enforcement scheme can function properly unless the economic consequences of  
committing violations are considerably higher than the costs of  avoiding compliance in the 
first place discounted by the probability of  detection.  The interminable cycle of  imposing 
minimal penalties may in fact create perverse incentives to ignore the law because getting 
caught is so much less expensive than steadfastly assuring compliance with OSHA standards.  
Until very recently, OSHA has made reducing fines to pennies on the dollar its normal policy, 
even in cases involving willful violations leading to fatalities.  Its failure to pursue strong 
penalties, even in appropriate cases, suggests undue deference to the business community.  
These enforcement failures are among the most important reasons why the agency needs 
more adequate funding.  
OSHA’s Cooperative enforcement Programs
OSHA has developed a number of  voluntary and cooperative programs to complement 
its traditional enforcement programs and foster a more symbiotic relationship between 
TABLe 2. Comparison of Statutory Penalties
OSH Act Endangered Species Act Clean Air Act
Serious violation: $7,000•	
 Falsifying records: $10,000•	
Willful violation: $70,000•	
 Willful violation that results in death: •	
$250,000 (indiv.) or $5,000 (corp.), 
plus imprisonment for 6 months. 
Knowing violation of the ESA: $25,000•	
Knowing violation of ESA regulations: •	
$12,000 or $25,000 (depending on 
regulation)
Criminal penalties: $50,000 and 1-year •	
imprisonment for knowing violation of 
ESA or certain regulations; $25,000 and 
6 mos. for other regulations.
Civil penalty: $25,000 •	 per day, per 
violation
Criminal penalties: up to 5 years’ •	
imprisonment for some violations, up 
to 15 years’ for others
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the agency, regulated industry, and workers.  Employers and some agency officials tout the 
programs as highly effective tools, but independent analysis by GAO and others suggests 
that OSHA lacks the hard data that would enable it to prove any of  the cooperative 
programs are truly effective.22
voluntary Protection Program (vPP)
OSHA established the VPP in 1982 to recognize worksites that have comprehensive safety 
and health management programs designed to maintain a safe workplace and below-average 
injury rates as compared to the rest of  their industry.  The program got off  to a slow start, 
taking twenty years to attract the first 1,000 worksites.  But the Bush administration made it 
a priority to expand the program and, between 2002 and 2008, it doubled in size.  There are 
now so many participants that the regional OSHA administrators who are responsible for 
primary administration of  the program have complained that they do not have the resources 
to continue adding new worksites.23  
The huge growth in VPP worksites can be attributed to the fact that participation in 
the program immunizes a worksite from all programmed inspections.  Immunity from 
programmed inspections can be a significant benefit for any worksite that might fall 
within a local or national emphasis program, as evidenced by reports on the first year of  
implementation of  the petroleum refineries NEP.  Across the country, OSHA started 65 
inspections at petroleum refineries and inspectors have issued citations at each of  the 48 
worksites where inspections have concluded.  Inspectors have found alarming numbers of  
violations at some sites.  At just 14 refineries, OSHA inspectors uncovered 1,517 violations, 
including 1,489 violations for process safety management.24  Yet, OSHA will not inspect 
20 percent of  the petroleum refineries under federal jurisdiction because they participate in 
the VPP and therefore enjoy exemptions from inspection under the NEP.  The exemptions 
would be acceptable if  the VPP program actually works to protect workers, but OSHA 
does not know whether this is true.  A GAO report found that OSHA had continued to 
expand the VPP program without collecting any data, much less analyzing any, to show 
that the program has produced any measureable impact on worker health and safety.25  
Following that report, OSHA’s acting head under President Obama, Jordan Barab, instituted 
a comprehensive review of  the VPP.
GAO’s report had examples of  how OSHA’s failure to vet its program endangered workers.  
The investigation found 30 VPP sites at which 32 fatalities occurred between January 2003 
and August 2008.  At the time of  GAO’s investigation, five sites had voluntarily withdrawn 
from the VPP, five had been given a one-year conditional status, and three had not yet been 
reviewed by regional staff  because enforcement investigations were ongoing.  Seventeen 
were allowed to remain in the VPP.  Incredibly, one of  those 17 retained its VPP status 
despite having had three separate fatalities over the five-year period GAO investigated.  In 
the same report, GAO “found that, for 12 percent of  the sites, at least one of  their three-
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year average injury and illness rates was higher than the average injury and illness rates for 
their industries.” 
State Consultation Programs
OSHA’s other longstanding voluntary compliance program is the state consultation 
program.  Created in 1975, the consultation program funds state-based entities to provide 
free occupational safety and health consultations to businesses that request them.  The 
occupational health and safety professionals who conduct the consultations are generally 
employed by state agencies or universities, and they are responsible for identifying hazards 
and potential violations, suggesting means for abating the hazards, and working with 
employers to implement abatement techniques as well develop broader health and safety 
programs.  The consultation program is intended to benefit small employers in high-
hazard industries, although “small” is defined for this program as a worksite with up to 250 
employees run by a company with up to 500 employees companywide.
Much like the VPP, participation in a consultation program can immunize employers from 
OSHA programmed inspections.  In addition, hazards uncovered during consultation 
visits, even if  they rise to the level of  a serious violation, will not result in penalties.  In 
an employer’s worst-case scenario, a serious violation will only be referred to OSHA 
enforcement staff  after the state consultant has proffered a remedy and the employer has 
failed to implement the remedy within a reasonable time.  By offering these incentives 
for participating in the program, OSHA has undermined, to some extent, its emphasis 
programs, since small employers in industries covered by emphasis programs often request 
consultations to forestall inspections. 
As with the VPP, OSHA does not collect enough data to determine whether the consultation 
program is having any positive impact on employees’ health and safety.  OSHA did not 
formally study the issue until 2002 – almost 30 years after the program began – when 
GAO suggested that it do so.  The researchers commissioned by OSHA to assess the state 
consultation programs’ effectiveness found some potential benefits, but determined that 
the benefits might actually be the result of  other factors, such as employer motivation (if  
employers who have a penchant for helping their employees are more likely to request 
consultations, the program might be getting undue credit).26  Ultimately, they concluded 
that additional data were necessary if  OSHA wants to properly evaluate the consultation 
programs.  Unfortunately, the White House Office of  Management and Budget (OMB), 
through its Paperwork Reduction Act powers, prevented OSHA from gathering data from a 
large number of  companies that participated in the consultation programs.  OMB rejected 
OSHA’s request to collect information from any firm employing less than 40 people, a 
restriction that eliminates “a significant portion” of  program participants and contributes 
to OSHA’s inability to fully assess the effectiveness of  its voluntary programs, according to 
GAO.27
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Divided and Conquered
When Congress passed the OSH Act in 1970, it opted for a separation of  policymaking 
functions that has had significant consequences for the development of  federal occupational 
safety and health policies.  Congress divided the responsibility for protecting workers 
among three agencies – OSHA, NIOSH, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission (OSHRC).  NIOSH was tasked with researching causes of, and solutions 
to, occupational safety and health problems.  OSHA, of  course, was given the power to 
promulgate and enforce safety and health standards.  And OSHRC was put in charge of  
adjudicating disputes between OSHA and employers who wanted to challenge a citation for 
failure to comply with the agency’s standards.  Not only did Congress divide occupational 
safety and health policymaking authority between the three agencies, it set up administrative 
barriers between them.  OSHA was placed in the Department of  Labor, NIOSH was 
set up in the Department of  Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human 
Services), and OSHRC was established as an independent commission made up of  three 
commissioners appointed by the President for staggered terms.
The Research Divide
Because NIOSH’s research agenda does not always track OSHA’s research agenda, 
NIOSH’s research is unused or underused by OSHA’s regulatory staff, who end up doing 
or commissioning research that could have been done by NIOSH.  In the mid-1990s, some 
members of  Congress found the NIOSH-OSHA coordination problems to be so severe that 
they attempted to eliminate NIOSH, “claiming NIOSH duplicates the research of  OSHA, the 
EPA, the National Safety Council, and private industry.”28  A bifurcated leadership structure 
is partly to blame.  With no specific person or office in charge of  coordinating NIOSH 
research and OSHA’s needs, it is inevitable that their paths would stray.  Further, NIOSH, in 
response to calls for its dissolution, made the strategic choice to adopt two new programs 
that effectively detached NIOSH from OSHA completely.  First, NIOSH established a new 
research prioritization program called NORA (National Occupational Research Agenda) 
that marginalized OSHA’s input into NIOSH’s future direction.  Second, NIOSH began 
emphasizing a “research to practice,” or “r2p,” mission, in which 
the primary target for NIOSH’s research is not OSHA, but 
employers, employees, and their representatives.
NORA operates under a committee structure that includes such 
a wide variety of  stakeholders that it marginalizes OSHA’s role in 
setting NIOSH’s agenda.  Granted, the NORA sector programs 
are not the sole determinant of  NIOSH’s research agenda.  
NIOSH’s work is also organized into 24 “cross-sector” programs 
that are linked to specific adverse health outcomes, statutory 
programs, and global efforts.  The cross-sector programs include, 
for example, musculoskeletal disorders, exposure assessment, and 
TABLe 3. nORA Council Structure
 
Sector Council
number of OSHA 
Staff on Council
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0 of 61
Construction 4 of 133
Healthcare and Social Assistance 1 of 34
Manufacturing 1 of 56
Mining n/a
Services 1 of 70
Transportation, Warehousing, Utilities 0 of 60
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0 of 35
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nanotechnology.  But, as with the NORA sector councils, the cross-sector program agendas 
are not developed through consultation with OSHA as a matter of  standard practice, thereby 
limiting their utility for OSHA. 
At NIOSH’s request, the National Academies of  Science undertook a systematic review 
of  several NORA and cross-sector research programs to assess their relevance and 
effectiveness in relation to occupational health.  Tellingly, NAS scored the relevance of  
the different programs’ research agendas on two factors:  (1) whether research focused on 
high-priority research areas (not necessarily priorities for OSHA); and (2) whether NIOSH 
appropriately transferred its research results to employers and employees (transfer to OSHA 
was essentially an afterthought).  So, for example, NIOSH’s respiratory disease (cross-sector) 
research program received a top score for relevance even though NAS concluded that  
“[c]urrent institutional silos [between NIOSH and other relevant federal agencies] obstruct 
the efficient use of  resources and development of  knowledge.”29
Congress intended that NIOSH be the scientific arm of  OSHA, which clearly has not 
happened.  Congress separated NIOSH from OSHA to protect the integrity of  its scientific 
enterprise, but this separation comes at a high price—its output is of  limited utility to 
OSHA.  Other agencies, such as FDA and EPA have their scientists in house, proving that 
this divide is unnecessary.  
The enforcement Divide
While the NIOSH-OSHA division of  power slows the development of  new health and 
safety standards, the OSHA-OSHRC split creates complicates the enforcement of  what few 
standards OSHA develops.  Congress adopted the split-enforcement model in the OSH Act 
in response to claims from industry that employers’ rights to due process are best preserved 
when the prosecuting agency (OSHA) is institutionally separated from the adjudicating 
agency (OSHRC).30  But there is little evidence that these perceived benefits outweigh 
problems with efficiency and policy coordination.  Employers’ challenges to OSHA citations 
can take many years to resolve and, in the meantime, the employer can delay abatement of  
the cited hazard.  At times, OSHRC has been without its full complement of  commissioners 
because of  disputes between the President and the Senate over certain nominees.  A partial 
commission can be responsible for significant delays in the appellate process.  OSHA, 
however, has no means of  insisting that OSHRC do a more efficient job of  resolving claims.  
Moreover, OSHRC works as a one-way ratchet:  employers can challenge OSHA citations, 
but employees and their representatives have no power to challenge the terms of  settlement 
agreements between employers and OSHA.  Unlike settlement agreements negotiated under 
the Clean Air Act and other public health-related statutes, OSHA’s settlements are not 
subject to public review and comment.
Another problem with the split-enforcement model is its effect on OSHA’s ability to 
interpret the OSH Act and its regulations to protect workers.  For years after Congress 
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passed the OSH Act, OSHRC took the position that Congress, by granting the Commission 
the power to adjudicate disputes about OSHA citations, gave it the power to make broad 
policy determinations.  OSHA, on the other hand, argued that OSHRC should accept 
OSHA’s interpretations of  the OSH Act and simply engage in case-specific fact-finding 
to affirm, modify, or vacate individual OSHA citations and penalties.  In 1991, in Martin v. 
OSHRC, the Supreme Court sided with OSHA in holding that reviewing courts must defer 
to OSHA’s interpretation of  the OSH Act contained in its regulations when confronted with 
conflicting, but reasonable, interpretations held by OSHA and OSHRC.31
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s unambiguous recognition of  OSHA’s fundamental 
supremacy in setting occupational safety and health policy, OSHRC keeps fighting to 
retain policymaking power by reading the Supreme Court’s opinion in a narrow manner.32  
OSHRC’s trick is to argue that OSHA’s reading of  its own standards or the OSH Act are 
unreasonable, allegedly making Martin inapplicable and giving OSHRC the power to decide 
the case based on its own interpretation.33  In one case, OSHRC used that approach, was 
overturned by the Eighth Circuit, and drafted such a narrow follow-up decision that one 
prominent attorney for large employers suggested OSHRC’s interpretation of  the relevant 
law might apply everywhere but the Eighth Circuit.34
Until OSHRC is directed to defer to OSHA’s policymaking decisions, disputes between the 
two institutions will continue to arise, sowing seeds of  confusion for employers, employees, 
and OSHA inspectors.  Only one other agency in the entire federal government is the 
subject of  a similar arrangement – the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).  In 
the rest of  the government, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) protects the rights of  
defendants without the problems that result from the split-enforcement arrangement.
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Recordkeeping Woes
While we can say with certainty that too many workers contract illnesses, suffer injuries, 
and are killed in this country as a result of  hazardous working conditions, recordkeeping 
problems at OSHA and the Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS) prevent the detailed analysis of  
illness, injury, and fatality data that would enable OSHA’s staff  to determine the best targets 
for enforcement and the most effective regulatory tools.  OSHA depends on three databases 
– BLS’s Annual Survey of  Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII), BLS’s Census of  Fatal 
Occupational Injuries (CFOI), and OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System 
(IMIS) – that need to be improved.
BLS – SOii
Each year, BLS surveys about 174,000 establishments to gather data from their OSHA-
required injury and illness logs.  BLS uses these data to estimate the total number of  injuries 
and illnesses suffered by U.S. workers.  Researchers have found that BLS likely misses 
between 20 and 70 percent of  all injuries and illnesses.35  The SOII will have some inherent 
uncertainty, since it is based on a sampling survey and not a comprehensive and precise 
count of  injuries or illnesses, but the uncertainty could be minimized.  There are three main 
reasons why the SOII data are incomplete:
BLS focuses only on occupations covered by the OSH Act, so injuries and illnesses 1. 
suffered by the self-employed, household workers, workers on small farms (i.e., less 
than 11 employees), and federal government employees are not counted.  State gov-
ernment employees are only counted for state-level statistics.
BLS’s reliance on employers’ OSHA logs reduces the likelihood that long-latency 2. 
illnesses (e.g., cancer caused by air contaminants) will be counted.  Employers do not 
track illnesses suffered by former employees. 
Employers’ safety programs include both disincentives for reporting work-related 3. 
injuries or illnesses (disciplinary actions and mandatory drug testing following 
on-the-job injuries) and incentives for keeping quiet (prizes awarded for extended 
periods without reported injuries).  The programs help employers minimize workers’ 
compensation premiums and reduce the possibility for OSHA inspections.
BLS is currently working with OSHA and state agencies to figure out a way to count injuries 
or illnesses suffered by public employees.  In addition, BLS is surveying individual employers 
to determine why some injuries and illnesses are reported to workers’ compensation 
programs but not on OSHA logs.  Finally, BLS is working with NIOSH on a pilot program 
that uses multiple databases – not just OSHA logs – to estimate injury and illness rates.36
BLS – CfOi
The strong point of  the CFOI is that it uses a variety of  data sources with the goal of  
developing a comprehensive census, rather than just a survey, of  occupational fatalities.  
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Following a critical 1987 report by the National Academies of  Science that suggested BLS 
had uncounted fatalities by up to 50 percent, it established a new system for obtaining data 
from a variety of  sources.  As a result, many occupational fatalities are counted in the CFOI 
database.  But the CFOI only captures accurately deaths caused by occupational injury.  
Deaths caused by occupational illnesses, particularly long-latency illnesses, are not accurately 
captured, greatly reducing the CFOI’s coverage and its utility for OSHA in setting health 
standards.
OSHA – iMiS
While the CFOI and SOII numbers are useful tools for setting rulemaking priorities or 
targeting industries and worksites for inspection, OSHA needs another database to analyze 
retrospectively the effectiveness of  its inspection programs.  Following each inspection, 
OSHA inspectors record the results of  the inspection and all relevant information about 
penalties and settlements in the IMIS database.  If  the system functioned well, it would 
organize and make accessible large amounts of  information that OSHA officials could 
use to determine the effectiveness of  enforcement emphasis programs, consultation and 
voluntary programs, and other efforts to improve occupational health and safety.  
However, the decades-old database has serious functionality issues, and gaps in the data it 
contains greatly limit its utility.  IMIS was originally designed in the 1980s, and the basic 
software has not been updated since.  Its obsolescence is well recognized, but OSHA 
currently has no plans to update the system.  GAO has documented the fundamental flaws 
in IMIS that frustrate any formal analyses of  OSHA inspections.  For instance, individual 
worksites are not assigned unique identifiers, so inspections, consultations, worker injuries, 
and other key datapoints cannot be linked easily.
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Recommendations for Reform
With its inadequate resources, outmoded statutory authority, misbalanced emphasis on 
voluntary compliance programs, imprecise understanding of  injury and illness rates, and 
the almost complete failure to issue safety and health standards, OSHA was in dire straits 
when George W. Bush left office.  Fortunately, President Obama has appointed a Secretary 
of  Labor, Hilda Solis, and OSHA officials, David Michaels and Jordan Barab, all of  whom 
have professional backgrounds that evidence a strong belief  in OSHA’s capacity to be an 
agent for positive change.  To affect that change, OSHA will need more resources and an 
improved statute.  But OSHA should also focus its attention on reforms that the agency 
can implement without the need to mobilize the broad resources necessary to accomplish 
legislative reform.  CPR is in the process of  convening a work group of  national experts 
to develop a blueprint for overhauling OSHA, using all available tools, including dramatic 
increases in the agency’s budget and new statutory authority.  This paper, intended to 
be a threshold analysis of  what makes OSHA so dysfunctional, will therefore confine 
itself  to administrative reforms that are within the existing legal authority of  the Obama 
Administration to implement.
enforcement
For the first time in decades, OSHA’s enforcement staff  is growing.  The 111th Congress 
and the Obama Administration provided OSHA with the funds to hire 130 new inspectors, 
many of  whom will be bilingual.  
As important as it is for OSHA to build its enforcement staff, it is more important 
that the enforcement program be properly designed to maximize the staff ’s 
effectiveness.  OSHA’s new leadership should reassess the scope and design of  the 
special emphasis programs used to target inspections.  Certain NEPs have broader 
implications than others.  For instance, OSHA analysis of  the chemical or petroleum refining 
industries’ successes and failures in implementing process safety management (PSM) policies 
might help OSHA understand how PSM can be used effectively in other industries.  But 
other NEPs – those focused on specific hazards or industries – might be targeting phantom 
problems or workplaces that are less hazardous than those that would be targeted through 
the SST program or through local and regional emphasis programs that do a better job of  
taking into account the professional experiences of  inspection staff.
OSHA inspectors should expand their use of  the general duty clause to better 
protect workers from health hazards.  Hundreds of  chemicals used by industry lack 
OSHA-derived permissible exposure limits (PELs), limiting OSHA inspectors’ ability to 
protect workers through the use of  citations.  This failure to protect workers exists even for 
chemicals that have been identified as hazards by another government or standard-setting 
NGO.  OSHA has the power to cite employers for general duty clause violations when an 
employee is exposed to a recognized hazard that has caused or is likely to cause death or 
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serious physical harm, and there is a feasible means of  abating the hazard.  Where an outside 
group has established an occupational health standard that is well-recognized and feasible, 
OSHA should use that standard as the basis for a general duty clause citation against any 
employer whose employees are exposed to the chemical above the standard.
OSHA’s post-inspection procedures are also ripe for review.  The statutory limits on 
penalties for violating the OSH Act are strikingly lower than limits under other public health 
and safety statutes, yet OSHA’s standard practice is to discount proposed penalties before 
announcing them.  This policy not only puts the agency in a poor negotiating position 
against the employer found to be in violation of  the law, but also reduces the deterrent effect 
of  OSHA’s enforcement program on other employers.  Following the 2009 inspection of  
BP’s Texas City refinery, OSHA proposed full penalties for each of  the 439 willful violations 
of  the PSM standard that OSHA inspectors discovered, leading to a record fine of  $87.4 
million.  OSHA should employ a similar “get tough” policy in appropriate cases, rather than 
automatically reducing fines to prompt settlements.  
Further, OSHA should enhance its criminal enforcement arm.  Between 2003 and 
2007, OSHA inspectors referred just 21 percent of  eligible cases to the Department of  
Justice for prosecution, and DOJ chose to pursue just 4 percent of  the referred cases.37  
The Solicitor of  Labor should work with OSHA’s enforcement division to train inspectors 
to gather better evidence for criminal violations of  the OSH Act.  But in light of  the 
weak criminal penalties in the OSH Act, the agency should also work with state and local 
prosecutors to prompt state criminal indictments of  employers following the death of  a 
worker in circumstances where such a penalty is warranted.  OSHA could employ specially 
trained inspectors to assist local authorities in gathering the necessary evidence and the 
Solicitor of  Labor could designate a lawyer in his office to serve as a liaison with state and 
local officials for this purpose.  Cal-OSHA has employed this approach with some success.
In any enforcement case that OSHA chooses to settle with a cited employer, OSHA 
should allow the public an opportunity to comment on the consent order or other 
terms of  the settlement.  The public, especially employees, their representatives, and 
the victims or families of  victims injured in an accident should have a chance to see the 
proposed terms of  settlement and comment in writing to OSHA’s attorneys.  Other public 
health statutes (e.g., the Clean Air Act)38 require government agencies to publish in the 
Federal Register a notice of  settlement agreements.  Even without an amendment to the OSH 
Act, OSHA has the power to involve stakeholders in the process of  settling enforcement 
actions.
OSHA must also reassess the proper balance between traditional enforcement (i.e., 
inspections) and compliance assistance.  With its current inspection force, OSHA only 
has the capacity to undertake formal investigations at a fraction of  worksites in a given year.  
Compliance assistance programs – in particular, the consultation program – can provide a 
useful tool for ensuring that employers are fulfilling their duties under the OSH Act, but 
these programs are only suitable for some situations.  Large employers do not fit the profile 
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of  companies that need the free resources provided by the state compliance assistance 
programs.  Large employers, for example, can presumably hire staff  or consultants to 
assist them in complying with OSHA standards.  The VPP may be more suitable for large 
employers, but OSHA should revise the standards for participation.  To earn the recognition 
that comes with participation in the VPP, companies should be required to do more than 
establish that they have lower-than-average injury and illness rates.  They should demonstrate 
a commitment to worker health and safety by voluntarily adopting more stringent health 
and safety controls than those minimally required by law (e.g., by adopting TLVs in place of  
PELs).  And OSHA should drop employers that fail to maintain exemplary records from the 
VPP program.  VPP participants are exempted from certain inspections, and they should 
have to earn that privilege.
OSHA has renewed its request with OMB to survey some smaller employers.  OMB 
should approve OSHA’s request or, better yet, expand it to cover a larger number 
of  small employers so that OSHA can assess the effectiveness of  its consultation 
programs.  More broadly, OSHA should ask OMB for additional funding and authority to 
collect data that evaluates whether its consultation and other cooperative programs have a 
positive impact on employer’s safety and health records.
Recordkeeping
In order for OSHA and stakeholders to properly assess the effectiveness of  its 
rules, enforcement priorities, and other regulatory programs, the agency needs to 
significantly improve its recordkeeping policies.  The most glaring problem is the 
agency’s outdated Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), which was originally 
designed to link enforcement data with other agency resources.  But IMIS has not been 
updated to take advantage of  the vast improvements in computer hardware and software 
since it originally came on-line in the 1980s.  To make IMIS a truly integrated system, OSHA 
should create unique identifiers for each employer and worksite and develop tools for linking 
the agency’s enforcement records to employer injury and illness logs, workers’ compensation 
records, and social security disability records.  IMIS should also have a web-based interface 
(with adequate privacy protections) that would enable employers, workers, union officials, 
researchers, and other interested parties to access all records.  The Obama Administration 
should ask Congress for a one-time appropriation to hire staff  and/or consultants to 
modernize the IMIS system as suggested above.
OSHA also needs to work with the Bureau of  Labor Statistics to improve the quality 
of  national injury and illness statistics.  Academic researchers have developed techniques 
for combining multiple data sources in a way that enables them to provide better estimates 
of  the incidence of  occupational injuries and illnesses than OSHA’s and BLS’s programs.  
Those researchers have uncovered systematic undercounting by OSHA and BLS that 
undermine OSHA’s efforts to identify and eliminate occupational hazards.  
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Furthermore, OSHA needs to address the incentives (e.g., prizes) and disincentives 
(e.g., disciplinary actions and drug testing) that employers use to prevent employees 
from reporting all occupational injuries and illnesses.  GAO has identified these 
tricks of  the trade as one of  the most significant causes of  occupational injury and illness 
undercounting.39  OSHA should consider the regulatory tools it could use to eliminate these 
programs.
Rulemaking
The OSH Act’s § 6(b) standard-setting process is an abject failure.  Of  the more than 60,000 
chemicals in commerce, OSHA has set standards for fewer than 1,000.  The rulemaking 
process has essentially ground to a halt:  In the past ten years, OSHA has finalized just a 
handful of  new standards, one of  them under court order.  And to make matters worse, 
most of  the health standards that OSHA has published are widely recognized as out-of-date 
and underprotective.  
OSHA should seek from OMB additional resources to beef  up its regulation-writing 
capacity.  Far too often, OSHA has been unable to complete regulations, or has had to drop 
them, because it lacks the staff  to do the necessary work.  Now that the administration has 
expanded the number of  inspectors at OSHA, it is time for the administration to expand 
OSHA’s capacity to work on more than a few regulations at one time.
In the meantime, OSHA should seek ways of  maximizing the impact of  the 
few safety and health that it has the budgetary capacity and legal authority to 
promulgate.  The Solicitor’s Office could potentially speed up rulemaking by reassessing 
OSHA’s burden of  proof  under the Benzene case.  Although the Supreme Court required 
OSHA to demonstrate that exposure to the substance at issue poses a significant risk to 
workers, it also recognized that OSHA would lack sufficient evidence estimate workplace 
health risk precisely.  The Solicitor should consider whether such language opens the door 
for OSHA to engage in a more truncated evaluation of  risk evidence and if  such a move 
would make it possible for OSHA to promulgate health regulations more quickly.
OSHA should also consider how it can avoid rulemaking delays caused by 
procedural hurdles imposed by other statutes.40  The Information Quality Act (a/k/a 
“Data Quality Act”)41 instructed the Director of  OMB to “provide policy and procedural 
guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and 
integrity of  information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies.” 
In 2002, the Department of  Labor issued department-wide guidelines for implementing 
the Data Quality Act that may require OSHA to send its risk assessments and economic 
feasibility analyses out for peer review.  The Data Quality Act itself  does not require peer 
review and OMB’s 2004 guidance on the subject leaves agencies with some discretion in 
selecting the appropriate timing and scope of  any peer review.  OSHA should therefore run 
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any peer reviews it deems necessary concurrently with public notice and comment periods 
specified in notices of  proposed rulemaking.  
Focusing rulemaking on generic standards that apply more broadly than single-
chemical regulations has the potential to greatly improve OSHA’s effectiveness.  
OSHA has experience with three types of  broadly applicable, or generic, standards – 
industry-wide standards, multi-chemical standards, and work-practice standards.  Utilizing 
generic rules to combine multiple hazards or agenda items into one rulemaking allows 
OSHA to engage stakeholders on a larger number of  issues at each of  these steps in the 
rulemaking process, eliminating the need to address smaller subsets of  issues in a piecemeal 
fashion.  While OSHA’s follow-up analysis of  stakeholders’ input after each stage may take 
longer, at least the agency will be able to reduce the number of  advisory committees it must 
convene, Federal Register notices it must publish, and hearings it must hold.
Moreover, the generic approach to rulemaking enables OSHA to address the full spectrum 
of  risks that workers face.  Rarely are workers exposed to a single hazard – more often, 
hazards exist in common combinations.  OSHA’s standards should reflect the realities of  
the workplace.  As evidenced by the rise and fall of  the ergonomics standard, however, the 
generic approach to rulemaking can be highly controversial, so OSHA must be judicious in 
its choice of  rulemaking targets.  Standards that apply to a single industry (e.g., refineries) 
or a specific health concern (e.g., chemicals that cross the placenta) might be good choices.  
OSHA should consider using a generic approach to update its PELs.  By grouping PELs 
into sets of  four or five chemicals that either pose similar hazards or are present in common 
work environments, OSHA might be able to move expeditiously through the hundreds of  
PELs that need to be updated based on new knowledge about risks and risk management.
The White House, too, has a role to play in speeding up OSHA’s regulatory process.  The 
White House’s Office of  Management and Budget should refrain from reviewing individual 
OSHA regulatory proposals, concentrating its energy instead on assessing longer-term 
issues.  For instance, OMB’s OSHA-focused staff  could do an independent review of  the 
efficacy of  rulemaking versus voluntary compliance programs, in terms of  occupational 
health outcomes, in an effort to help OSHA properly balance its limited resources.  If  OMB 
does not stop reviewing individual rules, OSHA should, at least, ensure better transparency 
regarding OMB’s effect on the final rule by publishing all OMB comments in the relevant 
docket.  Finally, the White House could amend the OMB peer review guidelines to clarify 
that agencies can conduct peer review during notice-and-comment periods.
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Conclusion
The distinctive characteristics of  a dysfunctional regulatory agency – a budget that is 
obviously inadequate for the agency’s vast mission, a governing statute that has not been 
modified to keep up with a modern regulatory environment, political interference with 
regulatory policies, and a consequent failure to make ongoing improvements for the people 
the agency is supposed to protect – appear in virtual caricature at OSHA.  Congress, the 
White House, and – most importantly – OSHA itself, must take steps to change course from 
the path OSHA is taking toward obsolescence.  The Obama Administration has taken some 
steps in that direction, but more is needed to protect America’s workers.
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